Uncertainty resolution in tax experiments: Why waiting for an audit increases compliance

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Year: 2012
Volume: 41
Issue: 3
Pages: 289-291

Authors (4)

Muehlbacher, Stephan (not in RePEc) Mittone, Luigi (Università degli Studi di Tren...) Kastlunger, Barbara (not in RePEc) Kirchler, Erich (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Tax compliance in a between-subjects experiment was higher when the uncertainty about the occurrence of an audit was not resolved until three weeks after participants had filed their tax returns than in a control treatment with immediate uncertainty resolution. Results have important implications for experimental tax research where providing immediate feedback whether participants are audited is common practice.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:soceco:v:41:y:2012:i:3:p:289-291
Journal Field
Experimental
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-26