Community standards

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2013
Volume: 148
Issue: 6
Pages: 2696-2705

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

I introduce a model of community standards relevant to the judicial determination of obscenity. Standards are defined as subjective judgments restricted only by a simple reasonableness condition. Individual standards are aggregated to form the community standard. Several axioms reflect legal concerns. These require that the community standard (a) preserve unanimous agreements, (b) become more permissive when all individuals become more permissive, and not discriminate, ex ante, (c) between individuals and (d) between works. I show that any rule which satisfies these properties must be “similar” to unanimity rule. I also explore the relationship between the model and the doctrinal paradox of Kornhauser and Sager [12].

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:6:p:2696-2705
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26