Preferential trade agreements, externalities, and domestic policy

B-Tier
Journal: Review of International Economics
Year: 2023
Volume: 31
Issue: 5
Pages: 1571-1601

Authors (2)

Natalia Bezmaternykh (not in RePEc) Paul Missios (Toronto Metropolitan Universit...)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

As multilateral trade barriers fall, there are increasing concerns that domestic policies will be used to undermine tariff cooperation. We examine how the ability to use domestic instruments affects the formation of trade agreements, and the resulting implications for the pursuit of free trade. We examine how optimal tariffs relate to domestic policy choices, and how negotiated restrictions on trade policy affect both domestic policies and the incentives to enter different trade agreements. We show that unrestricted domestic policy can lead to very different equilibrium trade agreements than with exogenous domestic policy.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:reviec:v:31:y:2023:i:5:p:1571-1601
Journal Field
International
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26