Risk sharing and transition costs in the reform of pension systems in Europe

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Policy
Year: 1999
Volume: 14
Issue: 29
Pages: 252-286

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Summary Costing pension reform Funded pensions are risky and a transition is expensiveUnfunded pay-as-you-go state pension schemes are financially unsustainable in Europe as elsewhere. Proponents of reform argue that, by switching to a fully funded scheme that takes advantage of the high return on assets such as equities, the solvency of the state scheme could be restored at little or no financial burden to current taxpayers. We show that this is mistaken for two reasons.First, making the transition is itself costly. Unless this cost is substantially financed by debt, it will fall on current generations, who are therefore likely to oppose the reform. Second, potentially higher returns are accompanied by significantly higher risk, which we quantify. We explain how an insurance scheme could be designed to mitigate both risk and moral hazard.— David Miles and Allan Timmermann

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:ecpoli:v:14:y:1999:i:29:p:252-286.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26