Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 1987
Volume: 102
Issue: 3
Pages: 453-476

Authors (2)

Paul Milgrom (Stanford University) Sharon Oster (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The Invisibility Hypothesis holds that the job skills of disadvantaged workers are not easily discovered by potential new employers, but that promotion enhances visibility and alleviates this problem. Then, at a competitive labor market equilibrium, firms profit by hiding talented disadvantaged workers in low-level jobs. Consequently, those workers are paid less on average and promoted less often than others with the same education and ability. As a result of the inefficient and discriminatory wage and promotion policies, disadvantaged workers experience lower returns to investments in human capital than other workers.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:102:y:1987:i:3:p:453-476.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26