Balanced implementability of sequencing rules

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2019
Volume: 118
Issue: C
Pages: 342-353

Authors (2)

De, Parikshit (not in RePEc) Mitra, Manipushpak

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We address the balanced implementation issue for sequencing problems under incomplete information. For sequencing problems with more than two agents, we identify an important priority based sufficient class of rules that are implementable with balanced transfers. We also show that any linear sequencing rule is implementable with balanced transfers if and only if there are more than two agents. In the appendix we identify the complete class of rules that are implementable with balanced transfers when there are two agents.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:118:y:2019:i:c:p:342-353
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26