Optimal Structure of Fiscal and Monetary Authorities

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking
Year: 2019
Volume: 51
Issue: 2-3
Pages: 289-312

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Why are monetary authorities not elected like fiscal authorities are? Advanced economies pair an elected fiscal authority with an independent monetary authority. Replicating the advanced economies' structure with authorities microfounded by a political economy model shows that this structure is the solution to a constrained mechanism design problem that overcomes time inconsistency and results in the highest possible welfare. Goal and instrument independence, singly and in combination, are insufficient to minimize time inconsistency, though their combination is necessary.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:jmoncb:v:51:y:2019:i:2-3:p:289-312
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26