Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two‐Period Cournot Oligopoly

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 2013
Volume: 22
Issue: 4
Pages: 852-874

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Two‐period Cournot competition between n identical firms producing at constant marginal cost and able to store before selling has pure strategy Nash‐perfect equilibria, in which some firms store to exert endogenously a leadership over rivals. The number of firms storing balances market share gains, obtained by accumulating early the output, with losses in margin resulting from increased sales and higher operation costs. This number and the industry inventories are nonmonotonic in n. Concentration (HHI) and aggregate sales increase due to the strategic use of inventories.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:22:y:2013:i:4:p:852-874
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26