Government‐Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Industrial Economics
Year: 1997
Volume: 45
Issue: 4
Pages: 429-443

Authors (3)

Svend Albæk (not in RePEc) Peter Møllgaard (Maastricht University) Per B. Overgaard (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In 1993 the Danish antitrust authority decided to gather and publish firm‐specific transactions prices for two grades of ready‐mixed concrete in three regions of Denmark. Following initial publication, average prices of reported grades increased by 15–20 percent within one year. We investigate whether this was due to a business upturn and/or capacity constraints, but argue that these seem to have little explanatory power. We conclude that a better explanation is that publication of prices allowed firms to reduce the intensity of oligopoly price competition and, hence, led to increased prices contrary to the aim of the authority.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jindec:v:45:y:1997:i:4:p:429-443
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-26