Competition, Monopoly Maintenance, and Consumer Switching Costs

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2010
Volume: 2
Issue: 1
Pages: 230-55

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Significant attention has been paid to why a durable goods producer with little or no market power would monopolize the maintenance market for its own product. This paper investigates an explanation for the practice based on consumer switching costs and the decision concerning maintaining versus replacing used units. In our explanation, if the maintenance market is not monopolized, consumers sometimes maintain used units that are more efficiently replaced. In turn, monopolizing the maintenance market avoids this inefficiency. In contrast to most previous explanations for the practice, in our explanation, the practice increases both social and consumer welfare. (JEL D42, D43, D82, K21, L12, L42)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:2:y:2010:i:1:p:230-55
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26