Optimal delegated portfolio management with background risk

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance
Year: 2008
Volume: 32
Issue: 6
Pages: 977-985

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Most investors delegate the management of a fraction of their wealth to portfolio managers who are given the task of beating a benchmark. However, in an influential paper [Roll, R., 1992. A mean/variance analysis of tracking error. Journal of Portfolio Management 18, 13-22] shows that the objective functions commonly used by these managers lead to the selection of portfolios that are suboptimal from the perspective of investors. In this paper, we provide an explanation for the use of these objective functions based on the effect of background risk on investors' optimal portfolios. Our main contribution is to provide conditions under which investors can optimally delegate the management of their wealth to portfolio managers.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jbfina:v:32:y:2008:i:6:p:977-985
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24