Factoring out the impossibility of logical aggregation

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2008
Volume: 141
Issue: 1
Pages: 100-113

Authors (1)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

According to a theorem recently proved in the theory of logical aggregation, any nonconstant social judgment function that satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is dictatorial. We show that the strong and not very plausible IIA condition can be replaced with a minimal independence assumption plus a Pareto-like condition. This new version of the impossibility theorem likens it to Arrow's and arguably enhances its paradoxical value.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:141:y:2008:i:1:p:100-113
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26