Endogenous market structure and the cooperative firm

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2014
Volume: 124
Issue: 2
Pages: 283-285

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

When the threat of entry by followers includes cooperative firms, the maximum fixed cost that a profit maximizing leader can endure is endogenous. The aggressive strategy required for entry-deterrence curtails the leader’s expected profit and can discourage its initial entry. In such circumstances a cooperative firm may yet be viable, despite having a cost handicap and no first-mover advantage.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:2:p:283-285
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26