Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2012
Volume: 102
Issue: 1
Pages: 396-427

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention. Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 130,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by 20 percent. (JEL D45, L24, N42, O31, O34)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:1:p:396-427
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26