Foundations of Incomplete Contracts

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 1999
Volume: 66
Issue: 1
Pages: 115-138

Authors (2)

Oliver Hart (not in RePEc) John Moore (University of Edinburgh)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In the last few years, a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of "incomplete contracting" However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper, we evaluate some of the criticisms that have been made of the theory, in particular, those in Maskin and Tirole (1999a). In doing so, we develop a model that provides a rigorous foundation for the idea that contracts are incomplete.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:66:y:1999:i:1:p:115-138.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26