The Collateral Costs of Clearing

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking
Year: 2021
Volume: 53
Issue: 5
Pages: 939-970

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study three generic clearing arrangements in the presence of two‐sided limited commitment: simple bilateral clearing, segregated collateral clearing through a third party, and—most sophisticated—central counterparty (CCP) clearing. Clearing secures the settlement of obligations from over‐the‐counter forward contracts that smooth the income of risk‐averse traders. Clearing requires collateral to guarantee settlement; this is costly, as it reduces income from investment. More sophisticated clearing arrangements require more collateral. As a result, the welfare gains of CCP clearing may be mostly due to segregation, while mutualization of losses could contribute little to welfare.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:jmoncb:v:53:y:2021:i:5:p:939-970
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26