Reserve prices in auctions with entry when the seller is risk-averse

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2017
Volume: 154
Issue: C
Pages: 6-9

Authors (2)

Moreno, Diego (Universidad Carlos III de Madr...) Wooders, John (New York University Abu Dhabi)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

We show that risk aversion raises the public reserve price rP above the seller’s cost c, but lowers the secret reserve price rS below the revenue maximizing reserve price r0. Further, rP<rS. Hence, for a risk averse seller, public and secret reserve prices are ordered: c<rP<rS<r0.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:154:y:2017:i:c:p:6-9
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26