First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2009
Volume: 65
Issue: 1
Pages: 256-269

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In this paper I obtain the mixed strategy symmetric equilibria of the independent private values, first-price auction for any distribution of valuations. The equilibrium strategy is a pure strategy at the continuity points of the distribution and bids a mixed strategy at the discontinuity points of the distribution.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:1:p:256-269
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26