Equal-need sharing of a network under connectivity constraints

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2011
Volume: 72
Issue: 1
Pages: 314-320

Authors (2)

Moulin, Herve (University of Glasgow) Laigret, Francois (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We propose a simple division of the costs of non-rival resources, when a user's need can be met by different subsets of the resources, and no resource is redundant. Our method is characterized by the Stand Alone core property, additivity in costs, and a symmetry requirement.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:314-320
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26