The price of imperfect competition for a spanning network

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2013
Volume: 81
Issue: C
Pages: 11-26

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A buyer procures a network to span a given set of nodes; each seller bids to supply certain edges, then the buyer purchases a minimal cost spanning tree. An efficient tree is constructed in any equilibrium of the Bertrand game.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:81:y:2013:i:c:p:11-26
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26