Asymmetric Information and Middleman Margins: An Experiment with Indian Potato Farmers

A-Tier
Journal: Review of Economics and Statistics
Year: 2018
Volume: 100
Issue: 1
Pages: 1-13

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

West Bengal potato farmers cannot directly access wholesale markets and do not knowwholesale prices. Local middlemen earn large margins; pass-through from wholesale to farmgate prices is negligible. When we informed farmers in randomly chosen villages about wholesale prices, average farmgate sales and prices were unaffected, but pass-through to farmgate prices increased. These results can be explained by a model where farmers bargain ex post with village middlemen, with the outside option of selling to middlemen outside the village. They are inconsistent with standard oligopolistic models of pass-through, search frictions, or risk-sharing contracts.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:tpr:restat:v:100:y:2018:i:1:p:1-13
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-26