Competition lessens competition

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2013
Volume: 120
Issue: 3
Pages: 419-423

Authors (3)

Godoy, Sara (not in RePEc) Morales, Antonio J. (Universidad de Málaga) Rodero, Javier (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We experimentally analyse simultaneous behaviour in a contest game and a public good game, whose endowment is shared. Competition for resources (i) almost eliminates overbidding, without affecting public good contributions and (ii) almost eliminates the behavioural spillovers between the games.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:3:p:419-423
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-26