Varying experimental instructions to improve comprehension: Punishment in public goods games

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Year: 2018
Volume: 73
Issue: C
Pages: 66-73

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We provide evidence that more explicit instructions can affect behaviour in a public goods game with punishment. Instructions that highlight the positive externality associated with public goods contributions and provide more examples improve subjects’ comprehension levels, as measured by shorter decision times in the experiment. They also lead to higher contribution levels in games with punishment opportunities, linked to better targeting of punishment.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:soceco:v:73:y:2018:i:c:p:66-73
Journal Field
Experimental
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-26