First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk

C-Tier

Journal: Economics Letters

Year: 2011

Volume: 113

Issue: 2

Pages: 108-111

Authors (2)

Maréchal, François (not in RePEc) Morand, Pierre-Henri (Aix-Marseille Université)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

When bidders have different risk aversion levels, we determine in a first-price auction, the asymmetric equilibrium strategies. We analyze the impact of asymmetric risk aversion levels on bidders’ markups and on the expected revenue and allocative efficiency of the auction.

First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk

Authors (2)

Abstract

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