Competence Implies Credibility

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2007
Volume: 97
Issue: 1
Pages: 37-63

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The (reputation for) competence of a central bank at doing its job makes monetary policy under discretion credible and transparent. Based on its reading of the state of the economy, the central bank announces its policy intentions to the public in a cheap-talk game. The precision of its private signal measures its competence. The fineness of the equilibrium message space measures its credibility

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:1:p:37-63
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26