A limit result on bargaining sets

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2018
Volume: 66
Issue: 2
Pages: 327-341

Authors (2)

Javier Hervés-Estévez (not in RePEc) Emma Moreno-García (Universidad de Salamanca)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract We introduce a notion of bargaining set for finite economies and show its convergence to the set of Walrasian allocations.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:66:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-017-1063-y
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26