Unemployment Insurance and Disability Insurance in the Great Recession

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Labor Economics
Year: 2016
Volume: 34
Issue: S1
Pages: S445 - S475

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) awards rise during recessions. If marginal applicants are able to work but unable to find jobs, countercyclical Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefit extensions may reduce SSDI uptake. Exploiting UI extensions in the Great Recession as a source of variation, we find no indication that expiration of UI benefits causes SSDI applications and can rule out effects of meaningful magnitude. A supplementary analysis finds little overlap between the two programs' recipient populations: only 28% of SSDI awardees had any labor force attachment in the prior calendar year, and of those, only 4% received UI.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/683140
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-26