Compliance with pre-harvest interval rules in apple production—A comparative analysis of green nudges among fruit growers and agricultural students in Germany

Abstract

Using an incentivized single-player multi-period business management game in which the participants have to manage a virtual apple farm as an experimental device, this study examines how nudges can improve compliance with regard to the 14-day pre-harvest interval rule after the pesticide application. Two different samples were examined, namely German fruit growers and agricultural students. Two different green nudge treatments were investigated: A nudge with facts and pictures which imply environmental and health damages that are presumably caused by breaching the 14-day pre-harvest interval rule, and a nudge with an additional social comparison suggesting that the majority of fruit growers in the same region comply with the rule. The core result of the study is that nudging has a preventive effect and reduces participants' non-compliance behavior in the business management game. The results are of interest to (agricultural) policy makers dealing with regulatory strategies in the context of pre-harvest intervals in apple production, as it is widely documented that nudging is an effective low-cost supplement to controls. Furthermore, the results are of interest for further research in the field of (experimental) economics and nudging, as we provide novel insights into the application of nudges.