Can you get what you pay for? Pay‐for‐performance and the quality of healthcare providers

A-Tier
Journal: RAND Journal of Economics
Year: 2010
Volume: 41
Issue: 1
Pages: 64-91

Authors (3)

Kathleen J. Mullen (RAND) Richard G. Frank (not in RePEc) Meredith B. Rosenthal (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Despite the popularity of pay‐for‐performance (P4P) among health policy makers and private insurers as a tool for improving quality of care, there is little empirical basis for its effectiveness. We use data from published performance reports of physician medical groups contracting with a large network HMO to compare clinical quality before and after the implementation of P4P, relative to a control group. We consider the effect of P4P on both rewarded and unrewarded dimensions of quality. In the end, we fail to find evidence that a large P4P initiative either resulted in major improvement in quality or notable disruption in care.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:randje:v:41:y:2010:i:1:p:64-91
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-26