Franchise Contract Regulations and Local Market Structure

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Law and Economics
Year: 2022
Volume: 65
Issue: 1
Pages: 105 - 130

Authors (2)

Charles Murry (University of Michigan) Peter Newberry (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Many US states have regulations that restrict the ability of franchisors to terminate franchise contracts. We estimate the economic effects of these regulations with a focus on how they impact market structure. Using data from the quick-service restaurant industry, we find that implementing franchise regulations results in 4–5 percent fewer establishments in the average county. Our results imply that franchise regulation leads to increased concentration in a large number of markets, as the number of counties in the bottom quartile of concentration would increase by between 12 percent and 15 percent with regulation.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/717159
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26