Managerial conservatism and corporate policies

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance
Year: 2021
Volume: 68
Issue: C

Authors (3)

Duong, Kiet Tuan (not in RePEc) Banti, Chiara (University of Essex) Instefjord, Norvald (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper investigates how conservative managers make corporate decisions. Motivated by psychology research, we use handwritten signatures (i.e., emotionally restraint disclosure styles) as a proxy for CEO conservatism. We find that firms with conservative CEOs engage more with safer investments (capital expenditures), engage less with risky policies (Research & Development expenses and debt financing), hold more cash, are less likely to pay cash dividends, and more likely to use stock repurchase schemes. We use the same proxy for CFO conservatism. We find that CFO conservatism is a better determinant than CEO conservatism for cash holding and financing policies, but the reverse is true for investment policies. Conservative CFOs prefer long-term debt to short-term debt.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:corfin:v:68:y:2021:i:c:s0929119921000948
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24