Flexible network rules for identified externalities

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2010
Volume: 69
Issue: 2
Pages: 401-410

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

I propose three modifications of Jackson's flexible network axiom (Jackson, 2005) when the structure of externalities across components have been identified. The first one takes into account the information about the externalities across components. The second one allows for coalitional deviations once the network has been formed. Finally, the third one tries to find a compromise with component efficiency (Myerson, 1977a).

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:69:y:2010:i:2:p:401-410
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26