The roll call interpretation of the Shapley value

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2018
Volume: 173
Issue: C
Pages: 108-112

Authors (2)

Kurz, Sascha (not in RePEc) Napel, Stefan (Universität Bayreuth)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The Shapley value is commonly illustrated by roll call votes in which players support or reject a proposal in sequence. If all sequences are equiprobable, a voter’s Shapley value can be interpreted as the probability of being pivotal, i.e., to bring about the required majority or to make this impossible for others. We characterize the joint probability distributions over cooperation patterns that permit this roll call interpretation: individual votes may be interdependent but must be exchangeable.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:173:y:2018:i:c:p:108-112
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26