The Strategic Role of Debt in Takeover Contests.

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Finance
Year: 1993
Volume: 48
Issue: 2
Pages: 731-45

Authors (2)

Chowdhry, Bhagwan (not in RePEc) Nanda, Vikram (University of Texas-Dallas)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a takeover contest, the presence of bidders' existing debtholders, if they can be expropriated by issuing new debt with equal or senior priority, allows bidders to commit to bid more than their valuation of the target. Such commitment can be beneficial because it deters potential entry by subsequent bidders and may allow a first bidder to acquire the target at a bargain price. The cost is that if entry by subsequent bidders does nevertheless take place, because the first bidder has committed himself to bid high premia, a bidding war ensues resulting in offers that may involve excessive premia, i.e., bids that are larger than the bidders' valuation of the target. Copyright 1993 by American Finance Association.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jfinan:v:48:y:1993:i:2:p:731-45
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26