CHOKED BY RED TAPE? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WASTEFUL TRADE BARRIERS

B-Tier
Journal: International Economic Review
Year: 2022
Volume: 63
Issue: 1
Pages: 161-188

Authors (3)

Giovanni Maggi (not in RePEc) Monika Mrázová (not in RePEc) J. Peter Neary

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The implications of red‐tape barriers (RTBs) under lobbying pressures differ markedly from those of traditional trade barriers. RTBs affect the extensive margin of trade and may respond in opposite ways to reductions in tariffs versus reductions in natural trade costs: The former induce a protectionist backlash that may reduce trade both at the intensive and extensive margin, whereas the latter may induce a reduction in RTBs magnifying the direct trade‐increasing effects. Furthermore, if tariff commitments are optimized, the availability of RTBs limits the extent of tariff liberalization, and political uncertainty tends to increase the prevalence of RTBs.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:iecrev:v:63:y:2022:i:1:p:161-188
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-26