Justifiable group choice

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2010
Volume: 145
Issue: 2
Pages: 583-602

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study the judgment aggregation problem from the perspective of justifying a particular collective decision by a corresponding aggregation on the criteria. In particular, we characterize the logical relations between the decision and the criteria that enable justification of a majority decision through a proposition-wise aggregation rule with no veto power on the criteria. While the well-studied "doctrinal paradox" provides a negative example in which no such justification exists, we show that genuine possibility results emerge if there is a gap between the necessary and the sufficient conditions for the decision. This happens, for instance, if there is only a partial consensus about the appropriate criteria for the decision, if only a subset of these criteria can be elicited, or if the judgment on criteria is based on probabilistic acceptance thresholds.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:2:p:583-602
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26