Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2019
Volume: 116
Issue: C
Pages: 179-184

Authors (2)

Nax, Heinrich H. (not in RePEc) Newton, Jonathan (Kyoto University)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper investigates the role that risk attitudes play in the evolution of conventions in the long run. Risk aversion is shown to be associated with the evolution of maximin conventions, and risk seeking with the evolution of payoff dominant conventions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:116:y:2019:i:c:p:179-184
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26