A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2015
Volume: 157
Issue: C
Pages: 1-27

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with responsive preferences. All stochastically stable matchings are shown to be contained in the set of matchings which are most robust to one-shot deviation.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:1-27
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26