Price sensitive prescribers

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2009
Volume: 104
Issue: 1
Pages: 20-22

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

When prescribers are not price sensitive, prescriptions segment the duopoly market and the unique dominant strategy equilibrium has both firms setting the monopoly price. When some prescribers are price sensitive, manufacturers use mixed strategies but still earn positive expected profit.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:104:y:2009:i:1:p:20-22
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26