Do bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank efficiency?

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance
Year: 2013
Volume: 37
Issue: 8
Pages: 2879-2892

Authors (5)

Barth, James R. Lin, Chen (University of Hong Kong) Ma, Yue (City University) Seade, Jesús (not in RePEc) Song, Frank M. (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.402 = (α=2.01 / 5 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The recent global financial crisis has spurred renewed interest in identifying those reforms in bank regulation that would work best to promote bank development, performance and stability. Building upon three recent world-wide surveys on bank regulation (Barth et al., 2004, 2006, 2008), we contribute to this assessment by examining whether bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank operating efficiency. Based on an un-balanced panel analysis of 4050 banks observations in 72 countries over the period 1999–2007, we find that tighter restrictions on bank activities are negatively associated with bank efficiency, while greater capital regulation stringency is marginally and positively associated with bank efficiency. We also find that a strengthening of official supervisory power is positively associated with bank efficiency only in countries with independent supervisory authorities. Moreover, independence coupled with a more experienced supervisory authority tends to enhance bank efficiency. Finally, market-based monitoring of banks in terms of more financial transparency is positively associated with bank efficiency.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jbfina:v:37:y:2013:i:8:p:2879-2892
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
5
Added to Database
2026-01-24