Singular games in bv'NA

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2010
Volume: 46
Issue: 4
Pages: 384-387

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Every simple monotonic game in bv'NA is a weighted majority game. Every game v[set membership, variant]bv'NA has a representation where u[set membership, variant]pNA, [mu]i[set membership, variant]NA1 and fi is a sequence of bv' functions with . Moreover, the representation is unique if we require fi to be singular and that for every i[not equal to]j, [mu]i[not equal to][mu]j.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:4:p:384-387
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26