Learning by doing in contests

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2013
Volume: 156
Issue: 1
Pages: 329-343

Authors (2)

Derek Clark (not in RePEc) Tore Nilssen (Universitetet i Oslo)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We introduce learning by doing in a dynamic contest. Contestants compete in an early round and can use the experience gained to reduce effort cost in a subsequent contest. A contest designer can decide how much of the prize mass to distribute in the early contest and how much to leave for the later one in order to maximize total efforts. We show how this division affects effort at each stage, and present conditions that characterize the optimal split. There is a trade off here, since a large early prize increases first period efforts leading to a substantial reduction in second round effort cost; on the other hand, there is less of the prize mass to fight over in the second round, reducing effort at that stage. The results are indicative of the fact that the designer often prefers to leave most of the prize mass for the second contest to reap the gains from the learning by doing effect. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:156:y:2013:i:1:p:329-343
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26