Upstream merger in a successive oligopoly: Who pays the price?

B-Tier
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Year: 2016
Volume: 48
Issue: C
Pages: 143-172

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This study applies a successive oligopoly model, with an unobservable non-linear tariff between upstream and downstream firms, to analyze the possible anti-competitive effects of an upstream merger in the Norwegian food sector (specifically, the market for eggs). The theoretical predictions are that an upstream merger may lead to higher average prices paid by downstream firms and at the same time no changes in the prices paid by consumers. Consistent with the theoretical predictions it is found that the merger had no effect on consumer prices, but led to higher average prices paid by the downstream firms to the merged firm.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:indorg:v:48:y:2016:i:c:p:143-172
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-26