Transplant quality and patientsʼ preferences in paired kidney exchange

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2012
Volume: 74
Issue: 1
Pages: 299-310

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) programs solve incompatibility problems of donor–patient pairs in living donor kidney transplantation by arranging exchanges of donors among several pairs. Further efficiency gains may emerge if the programs consider the quality of the matches between patients and donors. Limitations on the number of simultaneous required operations imply that every efficient PKE program introduces incentives for the patients to misreport how they rank the option of remaining in dialysis with respect to the available kidneys. Truthfully revealing their preferences is however, the unique protective (lexicographic maximin) strategy for patients under pairwise exchange maximizing PKE programs.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:299-310
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26