Debt maturity without commitment

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Monetary Economics
Year: 2014
Volume: 68
Issue: S
Pages: S37-S54

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

How does sovereign risk shape the maturity structure of public debt? We consider a government that balances benefits of default, due to tax savings, and costs, due to output losses. Debt issuance affects subsequent default and rollover decisions and thus, current debt prices. This induces welfare costs beyond the consumption smoothing benefits from the marginal unit of debt. The equilibrium maturity structure minimises these welfare costs. It is interior with positive gross positions and shortens during times of crisis and low output, consistent with empirical evidence.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:moneco:v:68:y:2014:i:s:p:s37-s54
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26