A trade-off theory of ownership and capital structure

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2019
Volume: 131
Issue: 3
Pages: 715-735

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper determines the optimal ownership share held by a unit into a second unit when both face a tax-bankruptcy trade-off. Full ownership is optimal when the first unit has positive debt, because dividends help avoid its default. Positive debt is, in turn, optimal when its corporate tax rate exceeds a threshold, and/or thin capitalization rules place an upper limit on the debt level in the second unit, and/or the Volcker Rule bans bailout transfers to the second unit. Full ownership is no longer optimal only if there is a tax on intercorporate dividend. This theory rationalizes observations on multinationals, financial conglomerates, and family groups.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:131:y:2019:i:3:p:715-735
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26