Reputation and the Market for Distressed Firm Debt

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Year: 2003
Volume: 38
Issue: 3
Pages: 503-521

Authors (2)

Noe, Thomas H. (Oxford University) Rebello, Michael J. (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Our analysis explains how vulture investors (vultures) can maintain and exploit their reputations for toughness. Vultures leverage their reputations to extract concessions from stockholders in debt restructurings. To profit from these concessions, vultures must first acquire debt from incumbent bondholders. Buying only the tranches most likely to render them marginal creditors maximizes vulture leverage in debt-purchase negotiations. Vulture profits are proportional to the degree of uncertainty regarding the identity of the marginal debt class.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jfinqa:v:38:y:2003:i:03:p:503-521_00
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26