Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2007
Volume: 97
Issue: 4
Pages: 1321-1339

Authors (2)

Volker Nocke (Universität Mannheim) Lucy White (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

We investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms' ability to collude when selling to downstream firms in a repeated game. We show that vertical mergers

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:4:p:1321-1339
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26