Industrial fatigue Redux

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2008
Volume: 99
Issue: 2
Pages: 286-289

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper presents a gift-exchange labor market model in which workers are prone to exhaustion. Although norms of reciprocity and fairness indicate that firms and workers must exchange 'gifts' in the form of higher wages and higher effort respectively, these incentives are mitigated by the evolution of fatigue and, therefore, the dynamic efficiency wage is lower than its static counterpart.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:2:p:286-289
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26