Unintended hedging in ambiguity experiments

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2014
Volume: 122
Issue: 2
Pages: 243-246

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We describe an ambiguity hedging problem in Ellsberg experiments, where combinations of individually ambiguous bets eliminate aggregate ambiguity, and which may yield incorrect classifications of ambiguity averse subjects. We propose a new classification consistent with this hedging possibility.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:122:y:2014:i:2:p:243-246
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26